The Week in Multilateralism
Friday, August 16, 2024
The World Health Organization Declares Emergency
World Health Organization director-general Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus this week declared the mpox outbreak in central Africa to be a public health emergency:
Dr Tedros’s declaration came on the advice of an IHR Emergency Committee of independent experts who met earlier in the day to review data presented by experts from WHO and affected countries. The Committee informed the Director-General that it considers the upsurge of mpox to be a [Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC)], with potential to spread further across countries in Africa and possibly outside the continent.
This marks the second time in the last three years that the WHO has declared an emergency focused on mpox.
Designating a global health emergency is a notable example of international organization autonomy. The International Health Regulations make clear that the director-general (after consulting with the expert committee) can declare an emergency even without the approval of the most affected country (the director-general does have an obligation to consult the affected state.)1 How effectively the WHO leadership has exercised that authority is a matter of significant debate. As several scholars noted in 2020:
The WHO’s decision-making under the IHR has come under intense scrutiny, especially its decision whether to declare a PHEIC. Global commissions, for example, strongly criticised the organisation for waiting 4 months after international spread of Ebola virus disease (EVD) in West Africa (2014–2016) before declaring an emergency. During the ongoing EVD outbreak in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the EC met a total of six times but did not declare a PHEIC until the fourth convocation, more than 11 months after the outbreak began.
The WHO’s covid declaration, of course, became part of the most turbulent chapter in the organization’s existence. The independent panel that was convened to assess the organization’s performance before and during the pandemic ultimately concluded that WHO leadership was too cautious in the timing and substance of its PHEIC declaration.
This latest mpox emergency declaration is a reminder that many of the changes sought to the international health architecture in the wake of the pandemic remain unrealized. In particular, the project of negotiating a new “pandemics treaty” appears to be at least temporarily becalmed.
Peacekeeping Conundrums in Gaza
A ceasefire in Gaza still appears distant, but discussion about a potential peacekeeping force for the devastated territory continues. This week, there was reporting that the United Arab Emirates would not participate in a force unless the Palestinian Authority has ultimate control in Gaza. The UAE is one of several Arab states that has signaled potential willingness to participate in a force. In June, an Emirati minister published a proposal for a “temporary international mission” but insisted that any request for it come from Palestine:
A temporary international presence in Gaza can only result from a formal invitation from the Palestinian Authority. This must come from a government that is led by an empowered, credible and independent new prime minister, ready to tackle the reforms that are necessary to improve governance for all Palestinians and capable of taking on the responsibility of rebuilding Gaza.
One idea for launching a peacekeeping process in Gaza is starting small. In a recent analysis for the Atlantic Council, Ahmed F. Alkhatib made the case for an initial force that would have authority over only a few critical areas of Gaza, including key border crossings with Egypt:
This beachhead should start with a limited peacekeeping force that has an extremely narrow mandate: deploying along the Gaza Strip’s borders with Israel and Egypt. Critically, this would help separate the Palestinians from the Israelis, prevent the establishment of an Israeli-occupied buffer zone inside Gaza that would rob the Palestinians of precious territory, prevent infiltration and new cross-border attacks, and serve as an early-warning system to coordinate with Israeli authorities in case of future security incidents. Hamas’s incentives to agree to this mandate-limited force would stem from its serving as a separation shield that would cement the end of the war and prevent the permanent presence of Israeli occupation forces.
Whatever its geographic remit, any peacekeeping initiative faces the question of what legal and political authority it would have and, specifically, whether it would have United Nations authorization. A few months ago, UN veteran Eugene Chen offered historically informed analysis of what the organization’s role might be in any international force.
Turkey Navigates Between Organizations
Turkey’s defense minister this week made soothing statements in the direction of NATO, pledging full support for the alliance’s mission. Those comments came as the Turkish government continues to pursue expanded ties with the China and Russia-dominated Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Earlier this month, Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdogan attended an SCO summit in Kazakhstan. In remarks there, he emphasized his commitment to deepening that relationship:
The organization has become one of our important dialogue channels with Asia owing to our dialogue partner status, which we’ve held since 2013…Our many years of experience fighting terrorism show that international cooperation is essential to dealing with this threat. In this context, we are ready to further strengthen our dialogue with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.
Writing for the Wilson Center, Yusuf Can offers perspective on Turkey’s efforts to manage relations with a range of multilateral structures:
Turkey seeks to play a role on various platforms by diversifying its multilateral mechanisms without alarming its traditional allies, including NATO. Its increasing interest in BRICS, the SCO, and other Global South partnerships should be seen as part of this strategy rather than an axis shift. NATO could benefit by having an ally involved in these circles.
Venezuela’s Multilateral Reverberations
Several multilateral organizations are reacting to the disputed election in Venezuela. A fact-finding mission established by the UN Human Rights Council sounded the alarm about post-election violence and arbitrary detentions. Speaking in Miami, the secretary-general of the Organization of American States, Luis Almagro, even suggested that the time has come for International Criminal Court (ICC) charges against the Maduro regime. But Almagro is being more outspoken than the organization as a whole, which has not reached consensus on how to handle the crisis. Outgoing Mexican president Manuel Lopez Obrador has criticized Almagro for his statements and refused to endorse a draft OAS resolution on Venezuela.
Briefly Noted:
French prosecutors are investigating the president of Interpol for alleged complicity in torture.
The African Union’s Peace and Security Council has suspended Sudan from organization activities.
Almost three months after the ICC prosecutor requested arrest warrants for alleged Gaza crimes, the court’s judges are still mulling the arguments.
Elon Musk is feuding with the European Union’s minister for digital affairs.
International justice junkies may find that it’s now easier to follow proceedings at the International Court of Justice.
The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the Asian Development Bank are teaming up to boost India’s energy sector.