The Week in Multilateralism
Friday, April 30, 2021
Apartheid and the ICC’s Palestine Investigation
Human Rights Watch this week released a blockbuster report arguing that Israel’s practices in occupied Palestinian territories constitute the crime of apartheid and calling for the International Criminal Court (ICC) to expand its investigation. At the moment, the ICC prosecutor is focusing on two main categories of Israeli conduct (as well as several forms of Palestinian conduct): alleged crimes committed during military operations in Gaza; and alleged abuses related to Israeli settlement policies in the West Bank. Human Rights Watch urged a much more comprehensive investigation:
In light of the decades-long failure by Israeli authorities to rein in serious abuses, the International Criminal Court’s Office of the Prosecutor should investigate and prosecute individuals credibly implicated in the crimes against humanity of apartheid or persecution. The ICC has jurisdiction over, and the prosecutor has opened an investigation into, serious crimes committed in the [Occupied Palestinian Territories]. In addition, all governments should investigate and prosecute those credibly implicated in these crimes, under the principle of universal jurisdiction and in accordance with national laws.
Unsurprisingly, the accusations received quick brush offs from both the Israeli and U.S. governments. But the report makes clear that the new ICC prosecutor will face pressure from multiple directions regarding the Palestine investigation. Key ICC member states, including Canada, Germany, and the United Kingdom, want the investigation ended or sidelined. But prominent nongovernmental organizations like Human Rights Watch have sway of their own, and their persuasive power is now being directed to broadening the court’s involvement in Palestine.
The course that the new prosecutor chooses in Palestine will likely have major implications for the Biden administration’s approach to the court. This week, an independent task force convened by the American Society of International Law published a report on U.S. relations with the court (full disclosure: I was a task force member). It recommended a variety of steps to improve the fraught relationship between Washington and the court, but offered this thought regarding Palestine:
Although it is anticipated that any investigation by the Prosecutor into these matters will be on a slow trajectory, there is no question that the U.S. relationship with the ICC will be influenced by the degree to which members of Congress, and the U.S. public, are concerned about developments in this investigation.
Moscow in May
According to reports, UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres will make his way to Moscow in the next few weeks for consultations on a range of topics, including Iran and Syria. The visit comes as the formal process for selecting the next secretary general moves toward what appears to be Guterres’ inevitable reappointment. (His current term expires at the end of December.) Only one other individual has stepped forward as a candidate, and she appears to have little if any official support (there are hints that another long-shot candidate might emerge).
But Guterres’s seemingly smooth path to reappointment doesn’t mean a permanent Security Council member cannot subtly remind the secretary general of its leverage. In that vein, a senior Russian diplomat noted pointedly that Moscow has not yet finalized its position regarding the incumbent’s reappointment:
Can ASEAN Find a Really Special Envoy?
Last week, ASEAN leaders met for a special summit to discuss the ongoing crisis in Myanmar. Controversially, the meeting included leaders of Myanmar’s military government. The session ended with a five-point consensus plan that included the cessation of violence and the initiation of a political dialogue involving all parties. Another of the consensus items was an ASEAN commitment to appoint a special envoy who would lead a mission to the country. With the summitry complete, the question now becomes who will take on that delicate task. Muhammad Waffaa Kharisma offered some thoughts on the qualifications:
To guarantee entry from the Tatmadaw, gain the trust of the [National Unity Government]…will require both a certain degree of leverage, courtesy not only from the special status of the envoy, but also of his or her personal background. The biggest challenge now for ASEAN is to find such distinguished person with the stature and ability to capture the respect and trust of the various contending parties in Myanmar, enough to press forward a difficult process of negotiation. Whoever he or she is, the person will have to be able to embody ASEAN’s (limited) leverage in Myanmar.
Whatever individual the regional bloc ultimately selects will also have to manage relations with the UN’s own special envoy, the Swiss diplomat Christine Schraner Burgener. She recently briefed the UN Security Council and has attempted (without success thus far) to gain access to the country:
Burgener told the council that on Thursday she again requested to visit Myanmar. Her previous requests have been turned down by the military, which said the time was not right.
“In the past three years, I have built constructive relations and confidence with key actors in Myanmar and this would allow me to get straight to substantive exchanges on how the current deadlock could be resolved, if given access to the country,” she said. “My presence could also help calm tensions.”
Mini-states and Multilateral Influence
Writing in Foreign Affairs, Jared Cohen and Richard Fontaine insist that small states have often pioneered successful multilateral initiatives. Specifically, they point to several Nordic initiatives, Togo’s role in a regional peace process, and a Jordanian effort on counterterrorism. The authors argue that even as the Biden administration embraces multilateralism, it should work to create room for small states to lead multilateral initiatives:
Given their successes, it is time for Washington to take a more proactive role in encouraging their formation. This can include encouraging particular small countries to take on leadership roles, pledging U.S. support for the efforts. It also means resisting the urge always to play convener in chief, urging others to lead multilateral efforts of which the United States will nevertheless be part.
Ursula the Purchaser
The New York Times this week offered an inside view of the blockbuster European Union deal with Pfizer-BioNTech for the purchase of millions of vaccines. The account revolves around Ursula von der Leyen, the former German minister who has been serving as European Commission president since 2019. One the notable aspects of the report is the complete absence of national leaders in the negotiations. According to the Times, von der Leyen’s personal engagement with top Pfizer officials was decisive in creating an environment for the agreement:
For a month, Ms. von der Leyen had been exchanging texts and calls with Albert Bourla, the chief executive of Pfizer, another vaccine supplier to the bloc. And as they spoke, two things became clear: Pfizer might have more doses it could offer the bloc — many more. And the European Union would be thrilled to have them.
That personal diplomacy played a big role in a deal, to be finalized this week, in which the European Union will lock in 1.8 billion doses from Pfizer, which, with its smaller German partner, BioNTech, made the first Covid-19 vaccine to get regulatory approval in the European Union.
For the European Commission, the Pfizer deal represents a chance to make up for lost time in the vaccination race and to refurbish its tarnished reputation for competence. For multilateralism, the more salient issue might be how regional organizations wield their considerable purchasing power, something that has received relatively little study thus far.
Unsanctioned
The World Bank has lifted sanctions it imposed on a major Canadian engineering firm in the wake of evidence that a subsidiary had bribed officials in Bangladesh. The Wall Street Journal reported on the company’s reprieve, which will extend to a range of different multilateral lenders:
SNC-Lavalin and its subsidiaries will now be able to bid for and carry out work on projects financed by the World Bank, the African Development Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the Asian Development Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank, the company said.
In 2013, the World Bank debarred a subsidiary of SNC-Lavalin and affiliates from bidding for World Bank projects for a decade, which at the time represented the longest debarment ever levied by the bank’s anticorruption unit.
Briefly noted:
The European Parliament has approved the post-Brexit trade deal with Britain.
In an effort to unlock International Monetary Fund loans, Ukraine is poised to pass tough new anti-corruption measures.
NATO is beginning an “orderly, coordinated, and deliberate” withdrawal from Afghanistan.
The outgoing head of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development described global corporate tax negotiations as a “once in a lifetime” opportunity.
With global tax negotiations near the top of the agenda, Italy takes over leadership of the G20 from Saudi Arabia.
The United Nations has published its annual report on the financing of the organization’s peacekeeping operations.