The Week in Multilateralism
Friday, February 5, 2021
Coups and countermeasures: This week’s military takeover in Burma prompted a flurry of activity at the multilateral level. The regional organization closest to the action is the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). The organization decided to admit Myanmar as a member in 1997 despite the misgivings of several Western countries. ASEAN’s traditional preference for non-interference in the internal affairs of its member states raised the question of how far its members would go in responding to the military’s most recent move.
Shortly after the takeover, the ASEAN chairman issued a statement that “encourag[ed] the pursuance of dialogue, reconciliation and the return to normalcy in accordance with the will and interests of the people of Myanmar.” The relatively mild tone of the statement likely reflected the fact that several ASEAN members appeared inclined to let events play out and withheld immediate condemnation. Writing in the South China Morning Post, Maria Siow argued that the organization’s tepid response is untenable:
The military coup in Myanmar on Monday is a clear sign that [ASEAN] cannot stick to its principle of non-interference and avoid reputational damage at the same time, especially when Myanmar continues to be the major thorn in the side of the 54-year-old organisation….If its reaction continues to be in the form of feeble and ineffectual statements, its credibility will increasingly be at risk.
On Friday, ASEAN members Indonesia and Malaysia urged a meeting of the organization to discuss next steps, but it is not clear whether the broader membership will agree.
At the United Nations, the immediate focus of activity was the Security Council, and the central question was what kind of response China would permit. In the past, Beijing has acted to shelter Burmese authorities from international condemnation, and the Council has issued only occasional nonbinding statements about the situation in the country.
Surprising some observers, the Council did ultimately speak with one voice—even if it did not manage to say the word “coup.” On Thursday, the British ambassador serving as the Council’s president this month released a unanimous statement calling for the release of opposition leaders and emphasizing the “need to uphold democratic institutions and processes, refrain from violence, and fully respect human rights, fundamental freedoms and the rule of law.” While the Council deliberated, UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres sounded an unusually definitive tone, insisting that the coup must fail. The UN’s human rights point person, Michele Bachelet, joined the chorus of condemnation and reminded the military of its international human rights obligations.
In the financial realm, both the World Bank and International Monetary Fund responded with expressions of concern about developments. Awkwardly, the IMF had just approved a no-strings-attached loan to the country to further its response to the pandemic. The World Bank has also provided funds for pandemic response and last year announced a new strategy for aiding development in the country. It is not year clear what impact the military takeover will have on future multilateral lending plans.
Leadership races: One of the more notable developments at the multilateral level in recent years has been a shift toward more open and transparent processes for selecting organizational leaders. Once decided entirely behind closed doors, several multilateral institutions now hold public hearings with candidates. In a few contexts, ingrained customs of selecting multilateral leaders only from certain countries or regions have given way. (In 2017, for example, Britain lost its traditional hold on a judgeship at the International Court of Justice.)
In several different organizations, leadership selection processes appear to be moving toward a conclusion. The World Trade Organization is in the market for a new director-general, and there is broad international support for Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, a former Nigerian minister with significant multilateral experience. News broke this week that Okonjo-Iweala’s sole remaining competitor, South Korean minister Yoo Myung-hee, will formally end her bid for the position. Barring unexpected resistance from the Biden administration, that should clear the way for Okonjo-Iweala to get the nod.
Meanwhile, the member countries of the International Criminal Court (ICC) continue their deliberations on the court’s next prosecutor. The ICC members have held a series of open consultations, first with a short list of candidates and then, after no consensus emerged, with a larger pool. While the deliberations are now occurring behind closed doors, there are indications that British lawyer Karim Khan is gathering the most support. Khan has been involved in multiple high-profile international prosecutions and now serves as the lead UN investigator into alleged crimes committed by the Islamic State. Other candidates include Irish prosecutor Fergal Gaynor and Spain’s Carlos Castresana.
With less attention, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) is selecting a replacement for Angel Gurría, who has served as the organization’s secretary general for nearly fifteen years. Often described as a think tank for affluent countries, the OECD has taken on new roles in recent years. Chris Giles of the Financial Times reported on the organization’s changing approach:
In the past 15 years of energetic top-down management by Mr Gurría, the OECD has embraced advocacy as a defining role. Previously known as a think-tank, Mr Gurría has set about changing this, complaining that the phrase “turns my liver to foie gras”. He said the organisation “likes to think of ourselves as a do-tank.”
Giles described the OECD selection process as “opaque,” which is not surprising given the organization’s still generally low-profile. Leading candidates for the OECD’s top spot include Swedish, Greek, and Swiss officials.
A three-judge panel of the International Criminal Court convicted Dominic Ongwen, a former Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) commander, of more than sixty war crimes and crimes against humanity. Most of the crimes targeted displaced people in northern Uganda. Human Rights Watch welcomed the decision as a “milestone,” noting that it was the “the first and only LRA case to reach a verdict anywhere in the world.” The Biden administration also expressed satisfaction with the decision and noted that the United States had helped facilitate Ongwen’s surrender to the court. (The State Department was careful, however, to pair its approval of the conviction with an insistence that the ICC remains in need of “significant reform.”)
Ongwen had been abducted the LRA as a child, and his case raised difficult questions of how past abuse should impact criminal responsibility. The peculiarities of the case aside, the conviction continues certain notable trends in the ICC’s work. Specifically, the court has had much more success in putting on trial rebel and militia leaders than it has senior government officials. The conviction also reflects the continued centrality of Africa to the court’s docket. Ongwen is the court’s ninth ICC conviction, and all nine have been from Africa. In recent years, the court has opened investigations in several non-African situations, including Georgia, Afghanistan, and Bangladesh/Myanmar, but these investigations have yet to produce public indictments or convictions.
Briefly noted:
African Union countries are convening virtually for a two-day summit.
Britain announced its intention to join the Trans-Pacific Partnership, which comprises eleven countries including Australia, Canada, Japan, and Malaysia.
The World Health Organization’s investigative team traveled to the Wuhan market where the pandemic is thought to have started and met with officials from the Wuhan Institute of Virology.
An Iranian case against the United States at the International Court of Justice moved forward.
A former senior official at the International Monetary Fund is taking a top position in the U.S. Treasury Department.