The Week in Multilateralism
Friday, October 7, 2022
A Developing Story: The UN Human Rights Council Punts on Xinxiang
The United Nations Human Rights Council this week voted against holding a debate on the situation in the Chinese region of Xinxiang. The vote came a few weeks after a group of UN human rights officials called for a Council session to consider possible crimes against humanity in the region. Al Jazeera reported on what was a close (and closely watched) vote in Geneva:
Many of those who voted “no” were Muslim-majority countries such as Indonesia, Somalia, Pakistan, UAE and Qatar. Among the 11 countries that abstained were India, Malaysia and Ukraine.
“This is a victory for developing countries and a victory truth and justice,” Hua Chunying, China’s foreign affairs spokesperson tweeted. “Human rights must not be used as a pretext to make up lies and interfere in other countries’ internal affairs, or to contain, coerce & humiliate others.”
The vote count is full of intriguing subplots (including the possible reasons for Ukraine’s abstention). For some in the human rights community, blame for the outcome falls in part on senior UN officials:
Whatever the sins of the UN’s bureaucrats, the vote was clearly a diplomatic victory of sorts for Beijing, which appears to have drawn successfully on skepticism of the rich West and its predilection for meddling in the less-rich world. In advance of the vote, China’s ambassador described the choice this way: “Today China is targeted. Tomorrow any other developing country could be targeted.”
China’s tactic of framing criticism of its human rights record as one of developed countries versus the developing world has been a recurrent one in multilateral fora. Even as China’s wealth and influence has increased substantially, Beijing has persisted in describing itself as member of—and indeed a champion for—the developing world. In an article published last year, the scholars Paul Joscha Kohlenberg and Nadine Godehardt analyzed the place of the “global south” in Chinese diplomacy:
[F]oreign policy elites in Beijing frequently work with a conceptualisation of the South that is, on the one hand, tied to China’s long-term self-perception of being a primus inter pares among developing nations, and, on the other hand, based on the assumption that an increasingly large ‘circle of friends’ can be engaged according to the diplomatic toolbox stemming from China’s experiences with South–South relations.
While there were a few developing countries that voted in favor of debate on Xinxiang, the outcome suggests that Beijing’s well-worn diplomatic strategy still has some life in it.
Reverberations on Security Council Reform
In the wake of the UN’s General Assembly speeches—and President Biden’s intervention in particular—the question of Security Council reform continues to attract attention. The idea of booting Russia from the Council remains understandably attractive to many observers, one of whom has provided a procedural roadmap for showing Moscow to the exits.
Most veteran UN observers—this one included—see evicting Russia as all but impossible (and probably not even desirable). But the near certainty that Moscow will retain its place in the UN’s inner sanctum still leaves open the question of whether the stars might align for an expansion of Council membership. There’s even a way in which raging East-West tension might lend the process some momentum, as Washington and Moscow compete in Africa and Latin America to demonstrate their reform bona fides.
The Washington Post, at least, is having none of it. In an editorial this week, the paper pooh-poohed the possibility of membership changes to the body:
[T]his suggestion might help Mr. Biden curry a little short-run diplomatic favor with these nations, but any such plan is a nonstarter because—Catch-22!—China and Russia would veto it. No doubt Beijing and Moscow have their own ideas for new permanent Security Council members, but it’s unlikely Japan and Germany—with which they have warred in the past, and which are current U.S. military allies—are on the list. Maybe China would recommend its friend Pakistan instead of India, another frequently mentioned candidate.
The Post’s skepticism about the likelihood of successful reform is certainly warranted, but its specific diagnosis of the political obstacles misses the mark; the paper fell into the trap of identifying the main obstacle to Council reform as the veto-wielding permanent members. In fact, as the research organization Security Council Report pointed out this week, the most important hurdle is achieving consensus within the broader UN membership about a reform plan:
[A] number of groups represent different positions on the reform of the Security Council, including the African Group, the Arab Group, Benelux, CARICOM, the Group of 4, the L69 Group, the Nordic Group, and the Uniting for Consensus Group. Notwithstanding broad agreement on the need for Council enlargement among member states, there is no consensus among members on the way ahead.
Some P5 member might certainly nix a future plan for Council reform, but at the moment there is no plan to block.
Manila To Stay Out of the ICC
The new president of the Philippines, Ferdinand Marcos Jr., made clear that he sees no chance his country will rejoin the International Criminal Court (ICC). The Philippines—one of relatively few Asian countries to have joined the court—abandoned it after the chief prosecutor initiated an investigation of alleged crimes committed during the Duterte administration’s bloody “war on drugs.” During a press conference, Marcos insisted the Philippines can handle its own investigations:
“The Philippines has no intention of rejoining the ICC,” Marcos declared in a press conference on August 1.
“The ICC said it wants to continue the investigation but we’re telling them that we already have an ongoing investigation here at home so why would there be a need for that?” Marcos added…
In theory, at least, the ICC’s investigation continues with or without official cooperation; the Philippines’ after-the-fact withdrawal did not strip the court of jurisdiction. But the apparent hostility from the new president leaves little room for optimism about future cooperation between The Hague and the new government.
Briefly Noted:
On the eve of the World Bank’s annual meeting, U.S. Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen urged the institution to adapt its lending programs.
The international Office of the High Representative in Bosnia used some of its powers to change Bosnian election laws. Major Western governments applauded the move—but there was plenty of criticism as well.
The head of the International Atomic Energy Agency described a contested nuclear power plant as belonging to Ukraine.
Turkey’s president Recip Erdogan is not reconciled to Sweden joining NATO and suggested that Finland could join on a different timeline.
The Philippines sees itself as an ASEAN peacemaker.
The African Union is making another attempt to mediate the civil conflict in Ethiopia. Meanwhile, the AU’s chief condemned the recent coup in Burkina Faso.
At a workshop hosted by the International Seabed Authority, Nigerian officials urged their country to take the lead in getting Africa into seabed mining.
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development has recognized Ukraine as a potential future member.
Not long after the ouster of the Inter-American Development Bank’s top official, the Secretary General of the Organization of American States faces scrutiny for a possibly improper relationship.
New Scholarship:
Hylke Dijkstra and Maria Debre have published a new examination of when, why, and how major multilateral creations expire. The cases of international organization deaths that they examine include (naturally) the League of Nations, but also the International Refugee Organization, the Warsaw Treaty Organization, and the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization, among others.