Competitive Multilateralism in Asia
As tensions simmer in the South China Sea, the diplomatic profile of the Quad (comprising Australia, India, Japan, and the United States) continues to rise. A joint naval operation involving the Quad countries (with France in the lead) kicked off early in the week. Meanwhile, Japan’s new prime minister, Yoshihide Suga, is reportedly finalizing plans for a trip to India later this month. And in an apparent shot at the Quad, Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov warned against “bloc-type approaches” in the region.
As the diplomatic pace intensifies, scholars and observers are trying to understand the broader geopolitical significance of the Quad grouping. Sujan R. Chinoy, a longtime Indian ambassador to Japan, argued that the Quad is here to stay:
The fact it that, all said, the QUAD is definitely here to stay. It is no longer “ocean foam that will soon dissipate”, as Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi once put it.
The QUAD’s future will depend on the choices that China makes. The greater China’s belligerence, the faster will the QUAD’s military-security agenda gather steam, perhaps even moving up into a 2+2 dialogue format.
Chinoy’s optimism is notable, because India (long averse to alliance structures) is often identified as being the most reluctant of the Quad members.
In War on the Rocks, Joel Wuthnow tracked how Chinese scholars and policy experts are watching the Quad’s development, with particular emphasis on how it interacts with other multilateral institutions in the region:
Some Chinese strategists took the Quad’s coalescence in 2020 as a cue that China should refocus its attention on sidelining the Quad from larger regional institutions and arrangements perceived to be less beholden to U.S. interests. Zhang Dongdong from the Central Party School argues that China should “deepen strategic interactions” and increase maritime security cooperation with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations as a “kind of counterweight” to the Quad. Zhang Jie contends that supporting pan-Asian economic cooperation through the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, where China is a member…would “cushion” the Quad “and its negative impact on the regional order.”
Who Will Negotiate a Global Minimum Tax?
U.S. Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen emphasized this week the importance of achieving a global minimum tax for corporations. She described a minimum rate as essential to avoiding a global “race to the bottom.” Reuters provided a helpful explainer on how the global minimum would work:
If countries agree on a global minimum, governments could still set whatever local corporate tax rate they want. But if companies pay lower rates in a particular country, their home governments could “top-up” their taxes to the agreed minimum rate, eliminating the advantage of shifting profits to a tax haven.
The Biden administration’s emphasis on the global minimum raises the question of how it will be negotiated. Two multilateral bodies appear to be at the center of the process: the G20 and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The Wall Street Journal offered some insight into the process:
The OECD has been coordinating talks on overhauling the taxation of company profits since shortly after the global financial crisis, when governments started to clamp down on tax avoidance to limit their rising debts. G-20 members form the core of the process, but are joined by many other countries in what is known as the Inclusive Framework.
OECD and G20 membership only partially overlap. Argentina, Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Russia, and South Africa are all members of the G20 but not the OECD. Several of these non-OECD members have their sights set on joining the organization, including Argentina and Brazil. (And during the Trump administration, there was some jockeying for position between the two South American countries).
The OECD role in the reenergized tax negotiations puts the Paris-based organization at center stage just as it comes under new leadership. Former Australian minister minister Mathias Cormann will take the helm on June 1, succeeding longtime secretary-general Ángel Gurría.
Celebrating the End of Sanctions
The Biden administration’s decision to lift sanctions on two International Criminal Court officials (prosecutor Fatou Bensouda and senior jurisdiction official Phakiso Mochochoko) won broad international approval. Expressions of support for the move poured in from the court itself and a variety of national capitals. Japan, one of the court’s largest funders, simultaneously urged the court to “promote constructive dialogue with non-States Parties including the United States.”
One country not enthused about the U.S. decision was Israel, which had reportedly urged the United States to maintain the sanctions as a sign of U.S. opposition to court investigations in Afghanistan and Palestine. Israel this week reiterated its longstanding position that the ICC has no jurisdiction to investigate in Palestine:
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s office issued a statement saying the government had agreed “to not cooperate” with the ICC.
Israel would instead send a letter to the court “completely rejecting the claim that Israel commits war crimes”, it said.
The letter would also “reiterate Israel's unequivocal position that The Hague tribunal has no authority to open an investigation against it”.
The Biden administration’s move leaves open the nettlesome policy question of how to respond if the ICC ultimately proceeds with cases against Israeli or U.S. officials.
Briefly noted
A group of scientists and public health experts has criticized the World Health Organization’s pandemic inquiry and called for a new investigation with broader terms of reference.
The African Union is reportedly switching vaccines, apparently to avoid duplicating the COVAX effort.
The International Monetary Fund boosted its forecast for global growth in the coming year.
Ukraine’s president wants a pathway to NATO membership.
The presidents of the World Bank and the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank met this week to discuss cooperation.
Writing at Pass Blue, Stéphanie Fillion profiles Vietnam’s UN ambassador, who is leading the UN Security Council in April.
In cooperation with several governments and international organizations, Interpol coordinated what it describes a significant crackdown on human smuggling in north Africa.
A major attack on a United Nations base in northern Mali killed four Chadian peacekeepers.
New and notable scholarship:
In a jam-packed anniversary issue of International Organization, Tanja Börzel and Michael Zürn explore the struggles of the “liberal international order.” They argue persuasively that the post-World War II multilateral order was actually was two distinct models:
In our view, the 1990s saw a systemic shift from a thin liberal post–World War II international order of liberal multilateralism (LIO I) to a post–Cold War international order of postnational liberalism (LIO II). LIO II is not only rule-based but it also openly pursues a liberal social purpose, with a significant amount of authority beyond the nation-state.
A key feature of the second multilateral order, from their perspective, was increasing “liberal intrusiveness.” This tendency of international organizations to reach into what had often been considered the internal affairs of states in turn generated several responses, including pushback and withdrawal.
Writing in the Hague Journal of Diplomacy, Loraine Sievers surveys the complex politics of gift-giving at the United Nations:
For some years the UN had declared a moratorium on accepting new gifts. Then, in 1990, a Soviet sculptor won the support of both Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev and US Secretary of State James Baker for a statue of Saint George slaying a dragon sculpted from sections of genuine missiles from both countries. Given the importance to the UN of greater cooperation between these two countries, the sculpture was accepted….
Sievers is a longtime UN secretariat official and an expert on the work of the UN Security Council, in particular.