The G20 and the Value of Hobnobbing
Russian officials announced this week that president Vladimir Putin would not attend the upcoming G20 summit in person (he might attend a few events virtually, it seems). That news put an end to what were no doubt complicated machinations on how to avoid direct contact between the Russian leader and key Western counterparts.
While Putin’s decision is being greeted with relief in many capitals, it’s worth considering the possible downsides of his absence. Historically, one of the values of the “G groupings” has been the opportunity for powerful leaders to meet in an informal environment, establish personal contact, and perhaps even achieve some level of rapport that can help bridge policy divides. As David Shorr has written:
[T]his is the essential nature of the Gs: that they revolve around meetings among policymakers at the highest level, particularly annual summit meetings of heads of state…Strictly speaking, the Gs represent nothing beyond those meetings and whatever policy advances emerge from them. But again, their lack of solid institutional structure is actually a strength, keeping the focus on the discussions of the ‘deciders’.
In a few cases, G meetings have actually been used to hash out agreements that might have been hard to attain in a more formal setting. The complicated diplomacy between Boris Yeltsin and Western leaders over the Kosovo crisis at the 1999 G8 summit stands out as an example of this function.
While the chances of G20-induced diplomacy with Russia over Ukraine have likely disappeared, this week did bring news of another great-power diplomatic opening via the upcoming summit. It appears that China and the United States will use the Bali meeting for a sideline session between Joe Biden and Xi Jinping. Via the Guardian:
Biden hopes the meeting will allow him to build a “floor” for relations between the two countries, but he will be honest about US concerns, including Taiwan and human rights, a senior administration official said on Thursday.
The White House spokeswoman, Karine Jean-Pierre, said in a statement: “The leaders will discuss efforts to maintain and deepen lines of communication,” as well as how to “responsibly manage competition and work together where our interests align, especially on transnational challenges”.
The utility of the G20 for arranging a confab like this are evident: the summit is already putting the leaders in close proximity and a meeting on the margins avoids the far greater logistical complications and heightened expectations that would come with a true bilateral summit. Given the parlous state of U.S.-China relations, the more high-level contact the better.
The COP, the Climate, and the Multilateral Architecture
The 27th Conference of the Parties (COP) to address climate change is underway in Sharm El Sheik. Per usual, the leaders of major multilateral organizations have descended en masse to meet with national diplomats, civil society, and each other. To greater and lesser extents, the world’s top multilateral bureaucrats have all attempted to incorporate climate into the work of their institutions (or at the very least give the appearance of doing so). UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres has used his position atop the multilateral heap to regularly cajole, coax, and criticize national political leaders to address the climate crisis.
Climate financing has been a hot topic at this year’s session, and the Bretton Woods institutions have received particular attention. (In the weeks leading up to the COP, it is worth recalling, World Bank chief David Malpass faced stiff criticism for evasive statements about the role of human activity in climate change.) The New York Times reported—a bit breathlessly—on proposed reforms to the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank being discussed at the COP:
[T]he reforms being considered would make significantly more money available to developing nations to mitigate the effects of climate change, deploy those funds faster, offer struggling countries lower interest rates and allow them to pause debt payments after major disasters. Supporters say the changes would also enable the institutions to attract trillions of dollars in private capital to help nations prepare for climate disasters and transition to wind, solar and other clean energy.
Should the overhaul to the World Bank and I.M.F. occur, it could represent the biggest mobilization of international finance in history to help developing countries cope with and adapt to a warming planet.
These reforms have been championed by the prime minister of Barbados, Mia Mottley, through what is referred to as the Bridgetown Initiative. But it’s not yet clear how significant any eventual changes will be; after all, the Bank and the IMF have already taken steps to integrate climate concerns into their lending, and they already offer low interest rates and longer repayment plans for the poorest countries. Some of the more ambitious Bridgetown items, including perhaps reapportioning voting share, will require much more complicated negotiation within the confines of those organizations—and away from the COP’s intense focus on climate.
As the Bank and the IMF shared the limelight, a different set of multilateral leaders were trying to spin up attention for the relevance of the organizations they lead. In a session with the director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the head of the International Energy Agency proclaimed “[n]uclear power is making comeback—and in a strong fashion.” The two organizations collaborated to create a “Nuclear Pavilion” at the COP as a focal point for discussions of how nuclear technology can address climate concerns.
From Capitol Hill to The Hague
This week brought an interesting moment in the complicated relationship between the United States and the International Criminal Court: A bipartisan Congressional delegation featuring Democratic senators Chris Coons and Robert Menendez and Republican Rob Portman visited The Hague and spoke with the chief prosecutor, Karim Khan.
Given the hostility that the ICC has often faced in the U.S. Congress, the meeting is notable. U.S. relations with the court, never particularly warm, hit a low point during the Trump administration. In September 2020, the United States slapped sanctions on the prosecutor and several other ICC officials as punishment for the court investigating alleged U.S. crimes in Afghanistan. But the animosity has a much longer history; shortly after the ICC opened its doors, Congress prohibited the U.S. government from providing many forms of direct support to the court.
Several factors account for the warming relations. First, the prosecutor made clear early in his term that he is “deprioritizing” the U.S. elements of the Afghanistan investigation. That decision was welcome news to the Biden administration and to those paying attention on Capitol Hill. Second, the prosecutor has made very little noise on the Palestine investigation, which includes allegations against Israeli soldiers and officials and which is very unpopular in Congress. Finally, the Ukraine war has reminded U.S. legislators that the ICC—and international justice more broadly—can actually serve American interests. Unsurprisingly, the U.S. senators made Ukraine the centerpiece of their comments in The Hague.
Briefly Noted
The European Commission criticized several elements of the U.S. green energy plan, which Brussels believes violate World Trade Organization rules. Meanwhile, the WTO chief has urged Brussels and Washington to avoid a confrontation.
NATO’s secretary general is confident the United Kingdom will continue to fund its military adequately despite the country’s financial crunch. In other alliance news, the secretary general announced the dates for next year’s NATO summit in Vilnius, Lithuania.
The African Union, fresh off success in mediating the Ethiopian civil war, is being criticised for being too passive in Chad.
India faced questions this week at the UN Human Rights Council as it goes through the Universal Periodic Review process.
French president Emmanuel Macron appeared to oppose the start of commercial seabed mining, which is regulated by the International Seabed Authority.
At its annual meeting, ASEAN leaders opened the organization’s doors to an eleventh member country—East Timor. Meanwhile, Cambodia’s prime minister doled out luxury watches to his fellow leaders as summit mementos.
INTERPOL helped snag several individuals in Greece and Italy who had allegedly organized a Ponzi scheme in South Korea.