The Superpower and the Security Council
The Rhetoric and Reality of Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield's San Francisco Speech
I’ve been offline for quite a while as I wrapped up final revisions and then did some publicity for my new book on the history of ocean governance. (We’ve also relocated the family to southern Spain for the semester, where I am doing research on multilateral maritime cooperation at the University of Cádiz.) But Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield’s recent intervention on the future of the United Nations is as good an excuse as any to revive the blog.
The U.S. ambassador to the United Nations delivered the speech in San Francisco at the Fairmont Hotel, site of the conference that produced the United Nations Charter nearly eighty years ago. She offered thoughts on the organization as a whole but her comments on the Security Council were particularly salient. Overall, she seemed to be aiming at a “new deal” of sorts between the superpower and the world security body, based on what she described as six principles.
Several of these principles were really little more than polished up diplomatic boilerplate. She insisted, for example, that the United States would engage with the Council constructively and that it would seek to defend human rights through the body’s activities. The ambassador also pledged that the United States would “defend and act strictly in accordance with the UN Charter.” It’s hard to know what to make of that particular commitment, as the United States has never (at least to my knowledge) admitted that any of its activities have violated the Charter.
Thomas-Greenfield did note obliquely that “[n]o Council Member can claim a perfect record on this over the last eight decades.” But the ambassador made no specific references to any past extralegal activity, and the Biden administration appears to have largely adopted the expansive view of recent administrations regarding its right to use force. Specifically, the administration has employed the “unwilling and unable” standard for when it can use force in self-defense. That approach is rejected by some countries and by many legal commentators as being overly broad.
More notable were the ambassador’s comments on the use of the veto power. She insisted that the United States would only use the veto in “rare, extraordinary situations.” The ambassador also stated that the United States will consider itself obliged to explain any use of the veto to the broader UN membership. That policy was actually signaled earlier this year when Washington backed a General Assembly resolution on the subject, but it is notable that the ambassador is doubling down on the policy.
This stance on the veto is of course far from being an ironclad restriction on U.S. freedom of action. What constitutes a “rare” or “extraordinary” situation will be decided by Washington alone; it’s quite possible that what the U.S. sees as unfair criticism of Israel—the prompt for almost all recent U.S. vetoes—would fit the bill. What’s more, the policy is eminently reversible by future administrations. Still, these pledges mark a significant moment in the U.S. relationship with the Council and a step toward the stigmatization of the veto power (particularly during Democratic administrations).
The ambassador’s comments on the reform of the Security Council’s membership were also intriguing. She described the administration’s policy this way:
We should not defend an unsustainable and outdated status quo. Instead, we must demonstrate flexibility and willingness to compromise in the name of greater credibility and legitimacy. We should forge consensus around sensible and credible proposals to expand the Security Council’s membership. During this month’s General Assembly, President Biden, Secretary Blinken, and I plan to consult broadly on our individual and collective responsibilities under the UN Charter, including critical questions around reform of the Security Council and other UN organs. You can expect to hear more from us on this issue.
The U.S. position on Council reform has for several decades been two-faced: in public, it has supported membership reform. Successive administrations have even backed the aspirations of specific countries for permanent Council seats (notably Germany, Japan, and India). Behind the scenes, however, Washington has shown zero interest in promoting consensus among the broader UN membership and has even put an occasional thumb on the scale against reform. I’ve argued before that this approach—while understandable—is ultimately misguided.
An optimistic reading of the ambassador’s speech suggests that the Biden administration may have turned a corner on the Council reform question. But given the long U.S. record of preferring the status quo, skepticism is in order. The next few months—and readouts from the promised consultations—will tell whether Washington has actually grown any friendlier to Council reform.