Morning Multilateralism
Thursday, July 2 2020
After weeks of wrangling, the UN Security Council unanimously passed a pandemic-inspired global ceasefire resolution. U.S. resistance to referencing the World Health Organization had held up passage for weeks, and artful drafting finally made the reference oblique enough for Washington to accept. The final resolution calls for parties to ongoing armed conflicts to enact a “durable humanitarian pause.” There are some notable holes in the call for a blanket ceasefire however. The resolution provides that “no ceasefire would apply for ongoing military operations against the extremist group ISIL, otherwise known as Da’esh, Al Qaeda, the Al Nusra Front and other Council-designated terrorist groups.”
The World Bank has barred two companies from participating in its projects. The companies, one from South Korea and another from Peru, acknowledged irregularities. They may not work on Bank-funded projects for more than a year. In the last several decades, the Bank has made anti-corruption one of its emphases and maintains an extensive list of companies barred from participation in its projects.
From the Institute for Security Studies comes a call for the African Union to expand its involvement in Somalia well beyond its current anti-terrorism mission. As the report notes, however, the prospect of a more comprehensive AU mission is complicated by tensions between key members:
Ethiopia and Kenya, both troop-contributors to [the current AU mission], differ on Somali politics. They have accused one another of interfering in the internal politics of the country and of trying to influence elections in regional states such as Jubaland, which borders both states. There have also been allegations of troop movements from both countries outside the AMISOM umbrella into Doolow town, heightening tensions along the border.
Similar intra-organization tensions are apparent in the Mediterranean, where France has opted out of the NATO naval operation. The mission, dubbed Sea Guardian, has as one of its objectives enforcing a UN-imposed arms embargo on Libya. The French decision appears to stem from an incident in June when a French destroyer confronted Turkish ships escorting a weapons delivery to Libya. France and Turkey have very different views of the Libyan conflict, and that divide is now manifesting itself in alliance operations.
Some reporting (here and here) on the lawyers who could be the next International Criminal Court prosecutor. Given the confrontation between Washington and the ICC, it is notable that one of the finalists, Morris Anyah, has deep connections to the United States and practices law in Chicago. As Mark Kersten notes, the short list has surprised many court-watchers. Several of those rumored to be front runners, notably Belgium’s Serge Brammertz, were not on the list. The ICC’s member states are not bound to select from the short list, and complicated politicking likely lies ahead.
New reporting on the European Union’s deliberations about its coronavirus “safe list” and why the United States was never going to make the cut.